FEC Cost Stack: From 21% EBITDA to Net Loss at 609 Venues
Dave & Buster’s opened its fiscal 2025 books showing $2,102.8 million of revenue across 243 venues. Lucky Strike Entertainment showed $1,245.3 million across 366 venues in fiscal 2026. The first lost $48.7 million at the bottom line. The second lost $35.8 million.
Neither company lost money in its venues. Dave & Buster’s earned $86.1 million of operating income, and Lucky Strike earned $136.8 million the same way. On our arithmetic, that works out to $354,000 of operating profit per Dave & Buster’s store and $374,000 per Lucky Strike venue, nearly identical figures for doors of very different size.
Everything between those venue-level profits and the published net losses is the cost stack: labor, food, rent, depreciation, corporate overhead and interest. This article builds that stack line by line from the two annual filings, converts every line into a share of revenue, and ends with the financing test that both operators, at 243 and 366 doors, currently fail.
If you are budgeting a single park, these are the only two datasets of this depth that anyone publishes for the family entertainment center business. They are worth reading slowly.
1. The Headline Reversal: Venues Earn, Companies Lose
The reversal is easiest to see per door. We divide each company’s operating income by its store count: $86.1 million over 243 stores gives $354,000 per Dave & Buster’s door, and $136.8 million over 366 locations gives $374,000 per Lucky Strike door. Then we do the same for interest expense: $634,000 per Dave & Buster’s store and $561,000 per Lucky Strike venue.
At both companies, the interest bill attached to each door is larger than the operating profit that door generates. That single comparison explains the net losses without any claim about bad management, weak demand or worn equipment.
Averages hide as much as they reveal, so the rest of this article stays at the full-portfolio level and flags every per-door figure as arithmetic of ours, not a disclosure by either company. The store counts and every dollar line, by contrast, come straight from the filings.
| Measure | Dave & Buster’s (FY2025) | Lucky Strike (FY2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Total revenue | $2,102.8M | $1,245.3M |
| Operating income | $86.1M | $136.8M |
| Operating margin | 4.1% | 11.0% |
| Net interest expense | $154.0M | $205.3M |
| Net income (loss) | ($48.7M) | ($35.8M) |
| Doors | 243 stores | 366 locations |
| Revenue per door (our arithmetic) | $8.65M | $3.40M |
| Operating income per door (our arithmetic) | $354K | $374K |
| Interest per door (our arithmetic) | $634K | $561K |
What this table is: raw figures from the two annual filings, plus three ratios we computed by division. Nothing here is a projection, and neither company publishes the per-door rows.
2. The Two Filings Behind the Stack
The Dave & Buster’s numbers come from its Form 10-K for fiscal 2025, the year ended 3 February 2026, filed with the SEC on 31 March 2026. The Lucky Strike numbers come from its Form 10-K for fiscal 2026, the year ended 28 June 2026, filed on 27 August 2026. The two fiscal years overlap by roughly seven months, so treat the pair as two recent annual snapshots rather than one synchronized period.
Lucky Strike, which traded for years as Bowlero, runs bowling-led venues: bowling brought in $561.6 million of its revenue, food and beverage $431.1 million, and amusements plus other lines $252.7 million. Dave & Buster’s runs larger boxes that combine a full restaurant with an arcade and attractions, and its filing splits revenue into entertainment at $1,323.5 million and food and beverage at $779.3 million.
One disclosure matters more than any other for what follows. Dave & Buster’s states in the 10-K that it leased all 243 of its operating stores. Lucky Strike’s lease footnote reaches a similar conclusion from the other direction, listing master leases, percentage rent and financing obligations. Rent is not a side detail in this industry. It is one of the largest cash costs in the stack, and neither company shows it on the face of the income statement as a single number.
3. The Full Cost Stack, Line by Line
Table 2 sets out every expense line both companies disclose on the face of their income statements, in dollars and as a share of revenue. The lines do not match one-for-one because the two companies classify costs differently; where a line has no counterpart, we note it rather than force a match.
| Income statement line | D&B $M | D&B % of revenue | LUCK $M | LUCK % of revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost of products / F&B cost | 300.3 | 14.3% | 96.6 | 7.8% |
| Payroll and benefits | 535.8 | 25.5% | 311.0 | 25.0% |
| Other store / location operating costs | 725.1 | 34.5% | 401.2 | 32.2% |
| Selling, general and administrative | 117.0 | 5.6% | 150.9 | 12.1% |
| Depreciation and amortization | 279.4 | 13.3% | 129.3 | 10.4% |
| Pre-opening costs | 19.0 | 0.9% | not separately disclosed | not disclosed |
| Impairment, disposal and other charges | 40.1 | 1.9% | 22.1 | 1.8% |
| Operating income | 86.1 | 4.1% | 136.8 | 11.0% |
| Interest expense, net | 154.0 | 7.3% | 205.3 | 16.5% |
| Net income (loss) | (48.7) | (2.3%) | (35.8) | (2.9%) |
Lucky Strike keeps its food and beverage cost line separate from its location operating costs, which is why its first row is smaller than Dave & Buster’s. Adding the two LUCK venue-level cost lines together (96.6 plus 401.2) gives $497.8 million, or 39.9% of revenue, against the D&B pair of $1,025.4 million, or 48.8%. The gap reflects what sits inside each catch-all line, and the next sections open those lines up.
4. Labor Converges at 25 Percent
The most stable number in the stack is payroll. Dave & Buster’s spent $535.8 million on operating payroll and benefits, 25.5% of revenue. Lucky Strike spent $311.0 million, 25.0% of revenue. Two operators with no overlap in format, one restaurant-led and one bowling-led, landed within half a percentage point of each other.
That convergence has a practical use. When a prospective owner models staffing, the question is usually “how many people do I need?” The filings answer a different and more useful question: whatever headcount you choose, the all-in cost of it, wages plus benefits plus payroll taxes, tends to land near a quarter of revenue at scale. A park that plans a 20% labor share while paying market wages is, in effect, planning a revenue target it has not yet justified.
We looked at the per-head version of this comparison in a separate analysis of revenue per employee; the two companies also agree there, within 1.6%. What the annual filings add is the share of revenue, which is the number that survives contact with a real profit and loss statement.
For a single park, the honest way to use this line is as a ceiling check rather than a target. Model your staffing rota first, price it fully loaded, and only then check the share it implies against your revenue plan. If your rota implies 30% at realistic revenue, either the rota or the revenue plan is wrong, and no equipment choice will fix it.
5. Gross Margin First: Food and Amusement Supplies
Both companies sell food at a gross margin that a standalone restaurant would envy. Lucky Strike spent $96.6 million on food and beverage costs against $431.1 million of food and beverage revenue, a food cost ratio of 22.4%. Dave & Buster’s spent $193.2 million against $779.3 million, a ratio of 24.8%. In both cases the kitchen returns roughly 75 to 78 cents of gross margin per food dollar.
The amusement side is thinner to the touch. Dave & Buster’s cost of entertainment supplies, prizes and redemption stock was $107.1 million against $1,323.5 million of entertainment revenue, about 8.1%. Lucky Strike does not split an equivalent figure out, so we do not construct one.
| Revenue and cost pair | D&B revenue | D&B cost | D&B cost ratio | LUCK revenue | LUCK cost | LUCK cost ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Food and beverage | $779.3M | $193.2M | 24.8% | $431.1M | $96.6M | 22.4% |
| Entertainment supplies | $1,323.5M | $107.1M | 8.1% | not split | not split | not split |
| Share of total revenue | F&B 37.1%, entertainment 62.9% | F&B 34.6%, bowling 45.1%, amusements 20.3% | ||||
The conversion that matters is the one from cost ratio to revenue mix. Food carries a high gross margin, but it only earns that margin when it actually reaches about a third of sales. Both operators sit at 34.6% and 37.1% respectively, which is why the kitchen, party packages and bar are treated as core floor program and not as a cafe appendix. We walked through the revenue structure behind these shares, including the booked-versus-walk-in split, in the revenue analysis of the same Lucky Strike portfolio.
For a trampoline park without a full kitchen, the takeaway is narrower but real. Whatever food and drink you sell needs to clear a 22 to 25% product cost, and it needs enough floor program behind it (parties, group bookings, snack bundles) to matter. A snack counter at 3% of revenue cannot rescue a weak admission margin, however good its food cost ratio looks.
6. Rent: The Line Hiding in the Footnotes
Neither company shows rent as a single line on the income statement. Dave & Buster’s buries store lease expense inside other store operating expenses, then discloses it separately in the segment footnote: $202.8 million, which on our division by 243 stores comes to $835,000 per store per year. Its lease footnote adds variable lease cost of $41.3 million and short-term lease cost of $1.5 million, bringing total lease cost to $254.8 million, 12.1% of revenue.
Lucky Strike’s lease footnote is more fragmented because part of its occupancy is financed rather than rented. Operating lease costs total $96.6 million (master leases, non-master location leases, percentage rent of $7.8 million and equipment leases), variable occupancy costs add $60.5 million, and after other items and sublease income the rent-only portion comes to about $153.5 million, 12.3% of revenue on our arithmetic. Its lease footnote total is much larger, $233.6 million or 18.8% of revenue, but $83.4 million of that total is finance lease amortization and lease-type interest, which the income statement books in depreciation and interest rather than rent.
Line up the rent-only figures and something surprising appears: 12.1% against 12.3%. Two companies with entirely different footprints pay almost the same share of revenue for occupancy. The difference is not how much rent they pay. It is how much of their occupancy they finance in ways that later show up as interest.
This is the most transferable number in the whole stack for a single-site owner. At scale, occupancy runs near 12% of revenue. A park paying 18 to 20% of projected revenue in rent is not negotiating from a stronger market position; it is borrowing occupancy cost against future revenue, and the next section shows where that road ends.
7. Depreciation: The Refresh Bill That Never Stops
Dave & Buster’s booked $279.4 million of depreciation and amortization, 13.3% of revenue and about $1,150,000 per store per year on our arithmetic. Lucky Strike booked $129.3 million, 10.4% of revenue, about $353,000 per venue. Impairments sit on top of those runs: $36.9 million of asset disposal and impairment inside Dave & Buster’s other charges, and a separate $22.1 million impairment line at Lucky Strike.
Depreciation is the accounting shadow of the capex cycle. A park that stops refreshing equipment stops earning the revenue that justified the original build, so the annual depreciation line is best read as the minimum honest budget for reinvestment. We mapped the cash version of this, actual capital additions per store, in the reinvestment capex analysis, where Dave & Buster’s spent $1.61 million per store of cash capex in fiscal 2025.
The per-door spread between $1,150,000 and $353,000 does not mean one operator refreshes better than the other. It mostly reflects box size and format: a restaurant-and-arcade box carries far more depreciable fit-out per door than a bowling-led venue. The durable lesson is the share, 10 to 13% of revenue, which is what the equipment bill costs you every year whether or not you write a check for it in that year.
For equipment decisions, this is where material quality stops being a purchasing detail and becomes a finance line. Panels, beds, foam and finishes that age faster force the same refresh earlier; our page on materials and build quality covers the specification choices that drive that gap.
8. Interest: The Sink That Turns Profit Into Loss
Here is the bottom of the stack, where both companies go under. Dave & Buster’s paid $154.0 million of net interest against operating income of $86.1 million, a coverage multiple of 0.56 times. Lucky Strike paid $205.3 million of net interest against $136.8 million of operating income, 0.67 times. In plain terms: the venues earned $222.9 million of operating profit between them, and the capital structures charged $359.3 million for the money behind them.
Part of Lucky Strike’s interest is rent wearing a different label. Its lease footnote shows $30.8 million of finance lease interest and $41.5 million of financing obligation interest, together $72.3 million, inside the $205.3 million interest line. Excluding those, non-lease interest runs near $133.0 million, about 10.7% of revenue on our arithmetic, still well above Dave & Buster’s 7.3%. Dave & Buster’s carries $1,515 million of long-term debt plus $7 million of current installments against $154.0 million of net interest, an implied effective rate of roughly 10% on our division.
The rest of each bottom line is small by comparison. Lucky Strike’s other expense line nets to a $34.0 million gain from an earnout liability revaluation, and its tax line adds a $3.7 million benefit, taking the pre-tax loss of $39.5 million down to the published net loss of $35.8 million. Dave & Buster’s has a $19.2 million tax benefit that trims its $67.9 million pre-tax loss to $48.7 million.
The capital charge, taken as total lease cost plus depreciation plus net interest, consumes 32.7% of revenue at Dave & Buster’s and 45.6% at Lucky Strike on our arithmetic. Computed EBITDA, which we define conservatively as operating income plus depreciation and amortization, covers 53% of the first charge and 47% of the second. Neither operator generates enough venue-level profit to pay for its own capital. That is the entire net loss story, and it is why the financing decision, not the equipment list, is the highest-stakes signature a park owner makes. Builders price that trade-off differently; our build-out capex analysis shows how construction budgets translate into the debt that produces this stack.
9. What the Data Does and Does Not Show
What it shows. Two complete annual cost stacks from the only FEC operators publishing at this depth: every income statement line in dollars, rent and lease costs in footnotes, store counts of 243 and 366, and revenue splits by category. Every derived per-door figure and share in this article comes from dividing those disclosed numbers, and we have labeled each such division.
What it does not show. The two fiscal calendars do not align: Dave & Buster’s fiscal 2025 ended 3 February 2026 and Lucky Strike’s fiscal 2026 ended 28 June 2026, so the pair overlaps by about seven months rather than measuring the same trading period. The catch-all cost lines classify differently: Dave & Buster’s other store operating expenses hold rent, marketing ($93.0 million) and other costs, while Lucky Strike spreads occupancy across location operating costs and a lease footnote that mixes rent with lease-type interest. We therefore compared rent footnote-to-footnote and said so explicitly, rather than comparing the catch-all lines directly.
What it cannot show. Per-door averages are not benchmarks for a single park. A Dave & Buster’s door averages $8.65 million of revenue, roughly 2.5 times a Lucky Strike venue, so its $1,150,000 depreciation per door says little about a 2,000 m² park. Neither company publishes guest counts, so no throughput or spend-per-visit figure can be derived from these filings. And computed EBITDA as we define it (operating income plus depreciation and amortization) is not either company’s own adjusted EBITDA metric, which excludes additional items. We did not use the company-adjusted figures anywhere above.
Correlation, not causation. Nothing here proves that revenue density causes profitability or that leverage causes losses in general. What the filings show is arithmetic: at these two companies, in these two years, venue-level operating profit was smaller than the cost of the capital behind it. That is a description, not a forecast.
10. Decision Rules for a Single-Park Operator
The filings do not predict anything, but they do license a few rules of thumb, each traceable to a line above.
- Occupancy. Keep total rent and occupancy charges near 12% of projected revenue. Above roughly 15%, you need the revenue density of an $8.6M door, not a mid-size park plan.
- Labor. Price the full rota, loaded, and expect it to land near 25% of revenue at scale (25.5% and 25.0% in the two filings).
- Food. Target a 22 to 25% product cost (24.8% and 22.4% disclosed), and treat F&B as real only when it reaches about a third of total revenue (37.1% and 34.6% disclosed).
- Refresh. Budget equipment reinvestment at 10 to 13% of revenue every year, matching the depreciation share (13.3% and 10.4%).
- Financing test. Interest expense must stay below your operating margin, with margin computed after corporate overhead.
Rule 5 deserves the emphasis, because both listed operators currently fail their own version of it: Dave & Buster’s runs a 4.1% operating margin against a 7.3% interest burden, and Lucky Strike 11.0% against 16.5%. The formula for your own park is simple division:
Financing ratio = projected annual interest cost / projected annual revenue Pass condition: financing ratio below projected operating margin (after overhead) Both D&B (0.073 vs 0.041) and LUCK (0.165 vs 0.110) fail this test today.
If your plan only passes because you assumed an optimistic revenue ramp, the honest fixes are a smaller loan, a cheaper box or a site with lower rent, in that order of preference. None of them require better equipment; all of them change the stack. When you are ready to pressure-test a layout and budget against these rules, our project walkthrough covers the sequence from floor plan to financing math.
| If your plan shows… | Against the filings | Then |
|---|---|---|
| Rent above 15% of revenue | 12.1% / 12.3% disclosed | Renegotiate the site or resize the box before signing |
| Labor above 28% of revenue | 25.5% / 25.0% disclosed | Cut the rota or raise revenue density; do not cut wages below market |
| F&B under 20% of revenue | 34.6% / 37.1% disclosed | Drop the kitchen ambition; do not carry kitchen cost for snack revenue |
| No annual refresh budget | 10.4% / 13.3% of revenue | Add the line; skipping it shows up as impairment, as both filings show |
| Financing ratio above operating margin | Both operators fail | Reduce the loan, not the equipment |
Revenue density, the denominator every one of these rules depends on, varies far more between sites than any cost line does. The size-band revenue analysis shows how the same franchise portfolio earns different revenue per square foot by box size, which is the other half of this arithmetic.
FAQ
What percentage of revenue should rent take at a trampoline park or FEC?
The two listed operators that disclose lease costs in footnotes both land near 12% of revenue for rent and occupancy-only charges (12.1% for Dave & Buster’s, 12.3% for Lucky Strike on our arithmetic from the footnotes). Treat 12% as the scale benchmark and 15% as a warning band, and remember that a share is only meaningful against a realistic revenue projection.
What is a good labor cost percentage for a family entertainment center?
Both filings converge at 25.0% and 25.5% of revenue for venue payroll and benefits. For a single park, the working approach is to price your staffing rota fully loaded first and check the share it implies, rather than setting a percentage and working backward. Shares well below 25% usually mean wages or benefits were modeled incomplete, not that you found efficiency.
Why do profitable family entertainment centers still lose money?
Because venue-level profit and company-level profit are separated by the capital charge. In the two filings discussed here, the venues generated $86.1 million and $136.8 million of operating income, while net interest expense ran $154.0 million and $205.3 million. At both companies, interest per door exceeded operating profit per door, so the businesses lost money at the bottom line despite profitable operations.
How much should I budget for equipment depreciation and annual refresh?
The disclosed depreciation lines run 13.3% of revenue at Dave & Buster’s and 10.4% at Lucky Strike. A useful planning budget is 10 to 13% of projected revenue per year for reinvestment, whether or not you spend it as cash in that year. The cash version of the same obligation shows up in actual capital expenditure, which ran higher still at Dave & Buster’s in fiscal 2025.
What food cost percentage should an FEC kitchen target?
The disclosed food cost ratios are 24.8% (Dave & Buster’s) and 22.4% (Lucky Strike) of food and beverage sales, so 22 to 25% is the evidence-backed band. The catch is revenue mix: F&B carried only 34.6% and 37.1% of total revenue at these operators, so a kitchen earns its keep only when food and party packages reach roughly a third of sales.
Sources
- Dave & Buster’s Entertainment, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended February 3, 2026, SEC EDGAR, filed March 31, 2026. sec.gov
- Dave & Buster’s FY2025 10-K, Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss), SEC EDGAR financial statement R5. sec.gov
- Dave & Buster’s FY2025 10-K, Leases note, lease expense detail, SEC EDGAR financial statement R56. sec.gov
- Dave & Buster’s FY2025 10-K, Segment Information note, store lease and marketing expense detail, SEC EDGAR financial statement R66. sec.gov
- Lucky Strike Entertainment, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year ended June 28, 2026, SEC EDGAR, filed August 27, 2026. sec.gov
- Lucky Strike FY2026 10-K, Consolidated Statements of Operations, SEC EDGAR financial statement R4. sec.gov
- Lucky Strike FY2026 10-K, Leases note, lease costs detail, SEC EDGAR financial statement R57. sec.gov
Planning the financing side of a new park? Send us your target area and market, and we will return a 3D layout and an equipment quote you can take to a lender. You can also reach the team directly through the project contact page.
