Trampoline Park Closure Cost: 12 Years of Rent Left Behind
Dave & Buster’s wrote off $17.8 million of long-lived assets in the fiscal year ended 3 February 2026, then booked a further $19.1 million on property and equipment it disposed of or stopped using. The two lines come to $36.9 million, or 1.75% of the $2,102.8 million in revenue the company recorded that year.
Lucky Strike Entertainment, which operates 366 venues, most of them bowling-led, reported $22.1 million of impairment and disposal losses on $1,245.3 million of revenue for the year ended 28 June 2026. That works out to 1.78%.
Two operators, two formats, two balance sheets, and the same ratio within three hundredths of a point. That consistency is the useful part, because it turns a discretionary accounting charge into something a single-site investor can plan against revenue.
The write-off is not the biggest number in a closure, though. The same filings carry a second figure, in a different note, that decides whether a failed park is a bad year or a decade: the rent that keeps running after the doors shut. Dave & Buster’s owed $2,595.2 million of future rent across 243 venues, with a weighted average of 12.2 years still to run.
This article prices the exit rather than the entry. Every figure below comes from a filing or a franchise disclosure document, and every ratio marked our arithmetic is a division we performed, with the inputs shown. Nothing here is a forecast of your park’s revenue, because we have no way to know it.
1. Two filings, 1.75% and 1.78%
Both companies run leased entertainment boxes in the United States, both review long-lived assets for impairment every year, and both separate the annual charge into two lines: a write-down of assets they keep, and a loss on assets they removed. That separation is what makes the exit case readable.
| Company | Fiscal year ended | Revenue | Impairment of long-lived assets | Loss on disposal or removal | Combined | Share of revenue | Venues |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dave & Buster’s | 3 Feb 2026 | $2,102.8M | $17.8M | $19.1M | $36.9M | 1.75% | 243 |
| Lucky Strike | 28 Jun 2026 | $1,245.3M | $17.2M | $4.9M | $22.1M | 1.78% | 366 |
The combined column is our addition. Lucky Strike reports the two effects on a single line, “loss on impairment and disposal of fixed assets, net,” at $22.1 million, and discloses the impairment charge of $17.2 million in the property note. The disposal remainder of $4.9 million is the difference, which is why we label it as derived rather than printed.
Read the two rows against each other and a pattern appears. Dave & Buster’s disposal loss of $19.1 million is larger than its impairment charge of $17.8 million. Lucky Strike runs the other way, with $17.2 million impaired and $4.9 million removed. The difference is what each company did with its weakest boxes. One wrote them down and kept trading. The other took assets out.
For a single-site owner, the combined ratio is the number that matters, because it is the only one either filing gives you per dollar of sales. At 1.75% to 1.78%, a park generating $2.26 million a year, which is the average across 106 franchised Sky Zone parks in the 2026 disclosure document, would carry roughly $39,500 of expected write-down and removal cost annually. Over ten years that is about $395,000, before any cash cost of closing.
What this does not mean: a 1.75% charge is not a cash reserve and not a prediction. It is the average outcome across 243 and 366 venues, most of which were never impaired. Individual parks land at zero for years and then at a large share of book value in one quarter.
2. Where each number comes from, line by line
The entry price of a venue is disclosed as a clean cost line. The exit price is scattered across three places, and that asymmetry is why closure budgets tend to be thin.
2.1 The entry side is one line
Dave & Buster’s reports $19.0 million of pre-opening costs for fiscal 2025, against 11 new stores opened. That is $1.73 million per store before the first guest walks in, and it excludes everything capitalised as property and equipment. The prior year divides to $1.34 million across 14 openings. A buyer who asks what it costs to open gets this number from the operating cost table in the filing.
Lucky Strike does not disclose a pre-opening line at all, which is worth noting: absence of disclosure is not absence of cost. It means you cannot use that filing to size an opening budget, and neither can we.
2.2 The exit side is three disclosures
The impairment charge sits in the property note and in the annual review of long-lived assets. The disposal loss sits inside a combined other charges and gains line, in Dave & Buster’s case $40.1 million for fiscal 2025, of which $17.8 million was impairment and $19.1 million related to property and equipment transactions. The third piece, the rent that survives the closure, sits in the lease maturity table, which readers tend to skip because it looks like a footnote about obligations rather than a statement about failure.
None of the three is hidden. All three are simply not adjacent, so the cost of closing gets assembled from memory rather than read off a page. The rest of this article assembles it.
3. The write-off: $3.6 million for four venues
Lucky Strike gives the only per-venue impairment figure in the two filings. The company reports a $14.2 million non-cash charge in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026 related to four underperforming locations whose carrying values were judged not recoverable. Divided by four, that is $3.56 million per venue (our arithmetic, from a printed total).
Three things about that number deserve attention before anyone uses it as a benchmark.
It is a carrying value, not a market value. The test compares the book value of a store’s assets, including the right-of-use asset, against the cash flows those assets are expected to generate. When expected cash flows fall below book value, the difference is written off. The charge therefore measures how much accounting value had accumulated, not what the equipment would fetch. A park that opened recently produces a bigger write-off under the same test than one that has already depreciated for eight years, even if both fail on the same day.
It is lumpy, not annual. Lucky Strike’s impairment charges across three years were $60.2 million in fiscal 2024, $1.9 million in fiscal 2025 and $17.2 million in fiscal 2026. The fiscal 2024 figure is mostly a $52.0 million write-down of the Bowlero trade name, a marketing asset rather than a physical one, which is a reminder that impairment lines mix things a buyer cannot touch with things they can.
The trend at Dave & Buster’s is the opposite of gentle. Impairment of long-lived assets went from $1.7 million in fiscal 2023 to $3.9 million in fiscal 2024 to $17.8 million in fiscal 2025, a 10.5-fold increase in two years on essentially flat revenue. Neither filing discloses how many stores produced the charge, so we cannot convert it to a per-venue figure, and we are not going to invent a denominator.
One detail cuts against the gloom. The disposal loss consists of assets disposed of or no longer in use, partially offset by gains resulting from lease terminations. Some exits produce a gain, because a landlord who wants the box back will pay to end the lease early. That is the most negotiable number in this entire article, and it is negotiated before opening rather than after.
4. The lease: 12.2 years and $2.6 billion
Here is the figure that decides the size of a failure. Dave & Buster’s lease note lists minimum future payments of $2,595.2 million for operating leases, against $934.6 million of imputed interest, for a present value of $1,660.6 million. The weighted average remaining term is 12.2 years at a 7.6% discount rate.
| Company | Leased venues | Future rent, undiscounted | Present value | Imputed interest | Remaining term | Discount rate | Per venue, undiscounted | Per venue, present value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dave & Buster’s | 243 | $2,595.2M | $1,660.6M | $934.6M | 12.2 years | 7.6% | $10.68M | $6.83M |
| Lucky Strike | 293 | $1,080.7M | $576.4M | $504.3M | 17.38 years | 7.45% | $3.69M | $1.97M |
Every per-venue figure in the last two columns is our division. Dave & Buster’s reports the lease liability for its 243 venues as a single portfolio figure, so the per-venue number is an average rather than a contract. Lucky Strike operates 366 locations: 293 are leased (292 in the United States and one in Mexico) and 73 are owned outright, so dividing by 293 rather than 366 is the correct denominator for rent.
The gap between the two rent columns matters more than the totals. About 36% of Dave & Buster’s contractual rent is imputed interest, money that never leaves the bank but is still part of what was signed. A closure does not retire that obligation at its present value. It retires it at whatever the landlord agrees to accept.
Set the rent against revenue and the scale becomes plain. Dave & Buster’s remaining rent equals 1.23 years of company revenue at the fiscal 2025 rate. Lucky Strike’s equals 0.87 years. Neither company could retire a full portfolio of leases out of one year of revenue, which is one reason both keep trading weak units while writing them down.
Annual rent per venue shows the same gap. Dave & Buster’s scheduled 2026 payments are $205.6 million across 243 stores, or $846,000 per store. Lucky Strike’s fiscal 2027 operating payments are $73.6 million across 293 leased venues, or $251,000 per venue. The smaller figure is not thrift. It reflects a different asset mix, and 73 of Lucky Strike’s 366 locations are owned rather than leased.
Trampoline beds, padding and netting do not last 12 years, and they certainly do not last 17. That mismatch is the mechanical heart of the problem, and it is why the lease term on a 35,000 sq ft (3,250 m²) box deserves more negotiation time than the equipment quote does. Our earlier breakdown of annual reinvestment capex per venue shows the same mismatch from the other side: assets have to be replaced while the lease is still running.
5. The equipment is the smallest recoverable line
Both filings split property and equipment by category, which lets you see how much of the invested capital is bolted to a building and how much could, in principle, walk out of the door.
| Company | Total cost | Land, buildings, leasehold improvements | Equipment, games, fixtures | Accumulated depreciation | Net book value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dave & Buster’s | $3,391.3M | $1,637.3M (48.3%) | $1,514.7M (44.7%) | $1,672.3M (49.3%) | $1,719.0M |
| Lucky Strike | $1,931.3M | $1,200.1M (62.1%) | $708.0M (36.7%) | $693.8M (35.9%) | $1,237.5M |
Percentages and category sums are our arithmetic. Dave & Buster’s equipment column adds games of $621.9 million to furniture, fixtures and equipment of $892.8 million. Lucky Strike reports a single line of $708.0 million for equipment, software, furniture and fixtures, and its attached column adds land of $244.0 million to buildings and leasehold improvements of $956.1 million. Both companies also carry construction in progress, excluded here.
Roughly half of the gross cost in each case is attached to the real estate. For a trampoline park the split should be different, with more in frames, beds, padding and netting, but neither filing covers a trampoline-led operator, so we will not pretend that these percentages transfer. What transfers is the direction. The attached half has no second life, and the equipment half has a poor one.
5.1 Depreciation is an assumption, and one company just changed it
The most revealing line in Lucky Strike’s fiscal 2026 filing is not an impairment. It is a change in accounting estimate. Management reviewed the estimated useful lives of fixed assets and revised them upward, citing operational changes, improved maintenance and technology that extends durability. The change reduced depreciation expense by $31.9 million in one year.
Nothing physical changed on the day of that revision. The same lanes, pinsetters and buildings were re-spread over a longer life, and $31.9 million of expense disappeared. An operator should draw an operational conclusion rather than an accounting one: equipment life is a variable you influence through maintenance, and a park that maintains its beds and padding can defer replacement. Our piece on the full cost stack of two listed operators shows how thin the margin is that this deferral protects.
5.2 There is no published resale price for a trampoline system
Neither filing publishes what a used trampoline court is worth, and no standard we can find addresses it. ASTM F2970 covers the design, operation and maintenance of trampoline courts as a safety standard. It says nothing about economic life or salvage value, and it is not a valuation document. We are not going to attach a percentage to resale, because every figure we have seen for it comes from someone selling removal services.
What can be said is structural. A trampoline bed is cut to a frame, a frame is laid out for a floor plan, and padding is cut to both. The further a fit-out goes from a standard rectangle, the less of it can be reused in another building. That is a design decision made months before anyone thinks about closure, and it is why a heavily customised park is worth less than a generic one on the day it stops trading.
6. One park, three lines
The two filings cover portfolios too large to map onto a single site, but the structure of the calculation travels. A closure produces three lines, and only two of them appear in the accounts.
| Line | Formula | What it depends on | Where it appears |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset write-off | Net book value at closure | Original cost, depreciation life, years traded | Impairment charge, non-cash |
| Removal and make-good | Strip-out cost plus restoration to the landlord’s specification | Lease clause, condition at handover, who owns the fit-out | Disposal loss, partly cash |
| Remaining rent | Annual rent multiplied by years left, less sublease income | Term, break clauses, assignment rights, market rent at exit | Lease maturity table, contractual |
Two of the three are visible in a filing. The make-good line is not, and neither company quantifies restoration obligations anywhere in these documents. That silence is not evidence that the obligation is small. It suggests the number settles at exit, when the tenant has little leverage.
Remaining rent = annual rent x years remaining - sublease recovery Walk-away cost = net book value + strip-out + remaining rent - salvage Annual equivalent = walk-away cost / years remaining
Work the formula with your own rent rather than ours. A 35,000 sq ft (3,250 m²) box at $850,000 a year, with nine years left on a fifteen-year term, carries $7.65 million of remaining rent, undiscounted. Discount it at 7.6%, the rate Dave & Buster’s uses, and the present value falls to roughly $5.4 million. Both figures are arithmetic on an illustrative rent, not a market observation. The point is the order of magnitude: the lease line is several times the equipment line, and it is the one that keeps arriving monthly.
Compare that with what the same box costs to fill. Slick City’s franchise brochure puts total investment for a 25,000 to 35,000 sq ft (2,320 to 3,250 m²) indoor slide park at $1.5 million to $3.1 million, a range we examined in the building requirements behind those parks. On those figures, remaining rent on a mid-term lease can exceed the entire original investment. A park that fails in year four has not lost its fit-out. It has lost its fit-out and bought nine more years of rent.
This is where the capex-per-park comparison becomes misleading when read alone. Build cost is the number everyone negotiates, because it is the number the equipment supplier quotes. It is also the only one of the three lines that stops when construction stops.
7. What the data does and does not show
This section is the reason to trust the rest. The two filings answer a narrow question and leave several bigger ones open, and the boundaries matter more than the averages.
- No per-store impairment count. Dave & Buster’s does not disclose how many stores produced the $17.8 million charge. The $3.56 million per venue figure comes from Lucky Strike’s four-location disclosure and applies to those four, not to the portfolio, and not to your park.
- Carrying value is not recoverable value. The four impaired Lucky Strike locations were written down to a level the company judged supportable. That is an estimate of future cash flows, made by management and reviewed by an auditor. It is not an auction result.
- Neither operator is trampoline-led. Dave & Buster’s and Lucky Strike are amusement and bowling boxes with large food and beverage operations. Their rent-to-revenue ratios and equipment shares reflect that mix. Extrapolating either to a 30,000 sq ft (2,790 m²) jump park is an analogy, not a measurement.
- The lease totals exclude contingent rent. Both maturity tables show fixed minimum payments. Percentage rent, which Lucky Strike reports separately, is not in the table, and neither filing states how many renewal options sit behind the reported term.
- Make-good is unquantified. No restoration obligation appears as a number in either document. A closure model built only on these filings therefore understates the cash cost by an amount we cannot determine.
- The impairment ratio is not stable across time. Dave & Buster’s moved from $1.7 million to $17.8 million in two years without a comparable revenue change, which means the ratio depends on how many stores cross the threshold in a given year. A single year is a sample, not a rate.
- There is no public resale index. Equipment salvage is the one line we refuse to estimate, because no filing, standard or trade source publishes transaction prices for used trampoline systems.
The honest summary is that the two filings price two of the three lines well, one of them approximately, and the third not at all. That is still far more than most closure budgets contain.
8. Decision rules, not a forecast
None of this predicts whether a given park will close. It changes what a sensible person negotiates before opening, and in what order.
- Match lease term to replacement life, not to the landlord’s template. If the term runs 15 years and the beds are replaced twice, the last third of the lease is rent on assets already written to zero. Ask for a break at the point where the first major replacement falls due.
- Budget 1.75% of revenue as a write-down allowance. That is the average of the two filings. It is not a cash reserve, but it is the line most single-site models omit, and omitting it flatters the payback period.
- Price the walk-away before you sign. Remaining rent equals annual rent multiplied by years left. If that product exceeds the total build cost, the lease rather than the equipment is the real investment, and it should be negotiated as one.
- Establish who owns the fit-out and what restoration means. A lease that requires the tenant to return a shell converts every padded wall into a demolition cost. Get the make-good specification in writing, with a cap.
- Ask about assignment and sublease rights in the same meeting as rent. The only real hedge against the rent line is the ability to put another operator in the box. A lease that permits assignment with consent, not unreasonably withheld, is worth more than a small rent concession.
| If this is true of your project | What it means | What to do first |
|---|---|---|
| Term longer than two equipment life cycles | The lease outlives the assets by design | Negotiate a break or a partial surrender right |
| Fit-out is mostly custom shapes and theming | Low reuse value in another building | Standardise frame modules where the design allows |
| Landlord owns the fit-out after handover | Lower strip-out cost, higher rent | Price both structures before choosing |
| Personal guarantee with no cap | The rent line follows you past the company | Cap the guarantee or tie it to a burn-down schedule |
| Percentage rent above a breakpoint | Cost rises exactly when trade improves | Model the breakpoint against your best month |
For the layout side of the same decision, our equipment layout breakdown for a 22,000 sq ft park shows how much of a floor plan is fixed steel and how much is movable. The more of it that is movable, the smaller the write-off at the end. The three-year Item 19 comparison shows what happens to unit economics when sales stay flat while costs do not.
If you are at the stage where the lease is still a draft, that is the cheapest moment to fix the exit. Our team can put a layout and an equipment schedule against your term sheet so the two documents describe the same building. The design-to-delivery process starts with the constraints, not the catalogue.
Send us your floor plan and lease term
We will tell you which parts of the fit-out survive a move and which do not, and what that means for the term you should accept.
Frequently asked questions
How much does it cost to close a trampoline park?
Three lines, not one. The asset write-off is the net book value at closure; for four venues Lucky Strike wrote down, the average was $3.56 million each. The removal and make-good cost depends on the lease and is not quantified in any filing we can find. Remaining rent is annual rent multiplied by years left, and on a mid-term lease it can exceed the entire original build cost.
Does an impairment charge mean the park is losing cash?
No. Impairment is an accounting adjustment that reduces the book value of assets when expected cash flows no longer support that value. It does not move money. The cash cost of a weak park appears in negative operating cash flow while it trades, and in rent, staff and utilities after it stops trading but before the lease ends. That is why the write-off and the lease deserve separate treatment in any model.
Can a trampoline park lease be exited early?
Only on terms written into the lease or negotiated afterwards. Break clauses, partial surrender rights, assignment and sublease provisions are the four levers, and all four are cheaper to obtain before opening than after. Dave & Buster’s reports gains from lease terminations inside its disposal line, which shows that terminating a lease early can produce a gain rather than a loss. That is a negotiation, not a right.
What happens to the trampoline equipment when a park closes?
It is removed, and its value depends on how standard it is. Beds are cut to frames, frames are laid out for a floor plan, and padding is cut to both, so a custom park has less reusable material than a modular one. No filing or standard publishes resale prices for used trampoline systems, so we do not quote a salvage percentage. Treat salvage as zero in your first model and let a buyer prove otherwise.
Is 1.75% of revenue a realistic annual reserve for one park?
It is a planning figure taken from two large operators, not a rule. The two landed within 0.03 points of each other, which suggests the ratio is structural rather than accidental. Impairment is still lumpy: a single park may carry no charge for six years and then take one large write-down. Reserve the percentage, and do not treat a quiet year as evidence that the risk went away.
Sources
- Dave & Buster’s Entertainment, Inc., Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 3 February 2026. Impairment, disposal, pre-opening and lease maturity detail. sec.gov
- Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation, Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 28 June 2026. Impairment charges, change in useful lives, lease maturities and location counts. sec.gov
- Sky Zone Franchise Group, 2026 franchise disclosure document, Item 19 average revenue across 106 franchised parks, as summarised by CapAdvisors. capadvisors.co
- Slick City Franchise, brand brochure, December 2023 edition: investment range and recommended building size for 25,000 to 35,000 sq ft parks. slickcityfranchise.com
- ASTM International, F2970 Standard Practice for Design, Manufacture, Installation, Operation, Maintenance, Inspection and Major Modification of Trampoline Courts. Scope checked for economic life and salvage; neither is addressed. astm.org
- Lucky Strike Entertainment, location table by brand and ownership for the year ended 28 June 2026: 366 locations, 293 leased, 73 owned. sec.gov
