Trampoline Park Valuation: What 6x EBITDA Pays Per Venue
A trampoline park in Sky Zone’s franchised estate is worth about $2.98 million at a 6x multiple of its EBITDA. Move the same park into the group the franchisor calls Model Parks, and it is worth $4.27 million. The brand, the fee load and the training are identical.
The difference sits in one line: average EBITDA per venue, $496,683 in the full franchised cohort against $710,790 in the screened one. Nothing else changed.
That is how a park is priced. Three numbers decide it, and only one of them is an opinion. Revenue per venue and EBITDA per venue are published by operators who have to sign their names to them. The multiple is a market convention, and it moves with interest rates, lease terms and whether the last four quarters of same-store sales were positive.
This analysis takes four disclosures and prices a park three ways: per venue, per square foot, and under stress. It uses Dave & Buster’s fiscal 2025 10-K, Lucky Strike’s fiscal 2026 10-K, Sky Zone’s FY2025 Item 19 as summarised by CapAdvisors, and the valuation exercise Airtopia published on 30 July 2026.
It will not tell you what your park is worth. It will tell you which number to argue about when a buyer gives you one.
1. The three numbers a buyer asks for
Every acquisition conversation reduces to the same sequence. What does one venue take in? What does one venue keep? What multiple does the market apply to what it keeps?
The first two questions are answerable from public filings. The third is negotiable, and it is where most of the disagreement happens. Table 1 puts the disclosed figures side by side, converted to a per-venue basis where the source reports a company total.
| Operator or cohort | Venues | Revenue per venue | EBITDA per venue | EBITDA margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dave & Buster’s, FY2025 | 243 | $8.65M | $1.80M | 20.8% |
| Lucky Strike, FY2026 | 366 | $3.40M | $0.91M | 26.8% |
| Sky Zone, all franchised parks | 106 | $2.26M | $0.50M | 22.0% |
| Sky Zone, 25,001–30,000 sq ft band | 30 | $2.49M | $0.58M | 23.3% |
| Sky Zone, 30,001–58,004 sq ft band | 30 | $2.55M | $0.55M | 21.7% |
| Sky Zone, Model Parks | 34 | $2.85M | $0.71M | 25.0% |
| Airtopia, five parks operating | 5 | $2.39M | Not disclosed | 24.0% net |
| Airtopia, 2028 plan | 16 | $5.61M | $1.68M | 30.0% |
Two of these rows are whole-company portfolios, four are unit-level cohorts, and two are company plans, which matters. A corporate figure carries head office cost; a unit figure does not. We flag the difference wherever it changes the answer.
Table 1 also does something a single filing cannot. It shows that a trampoline-led box lands near the same revenue no matter who reports it. Sky Zone’s 106 franchised parks average $2.26 million. Airtopia’s five operating parks, annualised from the company’s own statement, average $2.39 million. Those are two unrelated datasets, produced by two unrelated companies, six percent apart.
That six percent is the most useful number in this article. It means revenue per venue for a trampoline park is a known quantity, roughly $2.3 million to $2.4 million in the United States at today’s pricing. Everything above that has to come from a bigger box or a different attraction mix.
2. Revenue per venue separates formats, not skill
Dave & Buster’s reports $8.65 million per venue. That is 3.6 times the trampoline figure, and almost none of the gap comes from operating skill. It comes from the product: 37.1% of the company’s revenue is food and beverage, served at tables, in a box that also holds an arcade and a screen wall.
Lucky Strike sits at $3.40 million per location, with a mix of 45% bowling, 35% food and beverage, and 20% amusement and other. It is the closest comparable in scale to a large trampoline park, and it is still 42% above the $2.39 million Airtopia reports.
The useful comparison is not across formats. It is within one. Sky Zone’s own bands show what an extra 5,500 sq ft buys: the 22,501–25,000 sq ft cohort averages $2,015,495, and the 25,001–30,000 sq ft cohort averages $2,485,250. That is $469,755 more revenue, or 23.3%, for about 16% more floor at the midpoint of each band.
Then the pattern stops. The 30,001–58,004 sq ft cohort averages $2,551,115, which is $65,865 more than the band below it, or 2.7%, for a midpoint that is 60% larger. Beyond 30,000 sq ft, extra floor stops buying revenue.
Read the bands as cohorts, not as a ladder. Item 19 averages describe parks that chose their own size. A 58,000 sq ft park did not add 28,000 sq ft to a 30,000 sq ft park; it opened as a different building with a different lease. The 2.7% difference describes who built what, not what an extension would earn.
We covered the revenue side of that distribution in the 106-park size-band analysis. What that piece did not do is convert revenue into value, which is the number a buyer pays.
3. EBITDA per venue is where the spread is
Margins in this set run from 20.8% to 26.8%, and the ordering is not what most operators expect.
Dave & Buster’s earns 20.8% at the corporate level, down from 23.7% a year earlier, on revenue that fell 1.4% while comparable store revenue fell 5.0%. Lucky Strike earns 26.8% on a portfolio where 292 of 361 United States locations are leased and food and beverage is a third of the mix.
Among trampoline cohorts, the 25,001–30,000 sq ft band earns 23.3% and the 30,001–58,004 sq ft band earns 21.7%. The biggest boxes in the disclosed estate earn the thinnest margin. Rent scales with floor area; attendance does not.
The Model Park cohort deserves a note, because it is the number franchisors quote. It screens for at least 25,000 sq ft, four or more party rooms, and a full year of operation. Thirty-four parks qualify, and they average 25.0%. The screen is doing real work: 41.5% of all 106 franchised parks meet or exceed the all-parks average sales figure, but only 35.3% of Model Parks meet or exceed the Model Park average. Whenever a cohort is selected for performance, its average describes the selection as much as the operations.
That is why the median matters. Across all 106 franchised parks, median gross sales were $2,140,768 against an average of $2,255,992. In the Model cohort, median EBITDA was $667,077 against an average of $710,790. In both cases the average sits above the median, which means a minority of strong parks is pulling the number up. If you are buying one park rather than a portfolio, you are buying a draw from that distribution, not its mean.
4. Value is EBITDA times the multiple, nothing more
The arithmetic is one line long:
Enterprise value = EBITDA per venue x multiple Enterprise value / revenue = multiple x EBITDA margin
The second line is the one that gets forgotten. It says the ratio buyers quote as a revenue multiple is not an independent number at all. It is the EBITDA multiple multiplied by the margin.
Work it through on the Sky Zone average. EBITDA per venue of $496,683 at 6x gives $2,980,098, or $2.98 million. Divide that by revenue per venue of $2,255,992 and you get 1.32x revenue. Check the identity: 6.0 times a 22.0% margin is 1.32. It reconciles exactly, because both figures come from the same two disclosed numbers.
Table 2 runs the multiple across the whole set. It is arithmetic, not a forecast: every figure below is a disclosed EBITDA multiplied by 4, 6 or 8.
| Cohort | EBITDA per venue | Value at 4x | Value at 6x | Value at 8x | EV / revenue at 6x |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sky Zone, all franchised | $496,683 | $1.99M | $2.98M | $3.97M | 1.32x |
| Sky Zone, 25,001–30,000 sq ft | $578,290 | $2.31M | $3.47M | $4.63M | 1.40x |
| Sky Zone, 30,001–58,004 sq ft | $553,487 | $2.21M | $3.32M | $4.43M | 1.30x |
| Sky Zone, Model Parks | $710,790 | $2.84M | $4.26M | $5.69M | 1.50x |
| Lucky Strike | $910,400 | $3.64M | $5.46M | $7.28M | 1.61x |
| Dave & Buster’s | $1,796,700 | $7.19M | $10.78M | $14.37M | 1.25x |
| Airtopia, 2028 plan | $1,683,125 | $6.73M | $10.10M | $13.47M | 1.80x |
The spread inside one franchised estate is 43%: $2.98 million for the average park, $4.26 million for the screened one. That is the value of four party rooms and 3,000 extra square feet, priced at a constant multiple.
The spread across formats is larger still. Airtopia’s 2028 plan carries the highest revenue multiple in the table, 1.80x, because it also carries the highest margin assumption, 30%. Its value per venue is 3.4 times the franchised average, and that gap decomposes into 2.49 times more revenue per venue and 1.36 times more margin. Revenue does most of the work, which is the point operators miss when they shop for a buyer.
5. What one square foot is worth at 6x
Builders argue about cost per square foot. Buyers argue about value per square foot, and almost nobody has the second number. It falls straight out of Table 2 once you divide by the midpoint of each band.
| Sky Zone band | Midpoint area | Revenue per sq ft | EBITDA per sq ft | Value per sq ft at 6x |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16,000–22,500 sq ft | 19,250 sq ft (1,788 m²) | $95.00 | $20.61 | $123.66 |
| 22,501–25,000 sq ft | 23,750 sq ft (2,206 m²) | $84.85 | $17.50 | $105.00 |
| 25,001–30,000 sq ft | 27,500 sq ft (2,555 m²) | $90.37 | $21.03 | $126.18 |
| 30,001–58,004 sq ft | 44,002 sq ft (4,088 m²) | $57.98 | $12.58 | $75.48 |
The peak is not at either end. A square foot in the 25,001–30,000 band is worth $126 of enterprise value. A square foot in the largest band is worth $75.48, or 40% less. The extra 16,502 sq ft between the two midpoints brought $65,865 more revenue per park and $24,803 less EBITDA per park.
That is a design decision showing up as a valuation decision. Past roughly 30,000 sq ft, the additional area in the disclosed estate is not earning its rent, and a buyer applying a constant multiple will price it accordingly.
The conversion matters for anyone comparing a lease in square feet with a build cost quoted in square metres. One square metre carries $812 to $1,358 of enterprise value at 6x in this estate, depending on which band it sits in.
The limits of the method are worth stating here rather than in a footnote: the midpoints are midpoints. A park at 30,100 sq ft is treated as if it were 44,002. The band averages would move if the franchisor published actual areas per park, which it does not.
6. Stress-testing a $161.6 million valuation
On 30 July 2026, an analysis commissioned by Lelantos Holdings put an enterprise value of approximately $161.6 million on Airtopia Adventure Parks at full 2028 build-out. The figure is a target, not a current valuation, and it rests on three assumptions that are all published: 16 venues, $89.76 million of revenue, $26.93 million of EBITDA at a 30% margin, and a 6.0x multiple.
Each assumption can be varied on its own. Table 3 does that, holding the others fixed. The purpose is not to argue with the analysis; it is to show which of the three variables carries the value.
| Assumption set | 2028 EBITDA | Enterprise value | Change vs model |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disclosed model: 16 venues, 30% margin, 6.0x | $26.93M | $161.6M | — |
| Multiple at 4.0x | $26.93M | $107.7M | −33.3% |
| Multiple at 8.0x | $26.93M | $215.4M | +33.3% |
| Margin at 22.0%, the franchised average | $19.75M | $118.5M | −26.7% |
| 12 venues instead of 16 | $20.20M | $121.2M | −25.0% |
| 12 venues, 22.0% margin, 4.0x | $14.81M | $59.2M | −63.4% |
The multiple and the margin each move the answer by about a quarter to a third. Together with the venue count, they take $161.6 million down to $59.2 million, which is the same order of magnitude as the capital the company plans to spend to get there.
That capital is disclosed separately. The letter of intent signed on 4 August 2026 covers two locations to start and a pipeline of 8 to 14 more over 18 months, at an estimated aggregate value of $60 million to $84 million. Across 10 to 16 sites, that is $3.75 million to $8.40 million per site, non-binding and subject to site-by-site pricing.
Set the two disclosures against each other. At the base case, $161.6 million of value against $60 million to $84 million of build-out is 1.9 to 2.7 times capital. At the stressed case, $59.2 million against the same spend is roughly 1.0 times. The valuation and the capital programme are the same size once any two assumptions slip.
Where the 2028 revenue assumption has to come from
Revenue per venue is the assumption doing the most work, and it is the easiest to check. The company states approximately $11.96 million in annualised revenue across five parks, which is $2.39 million per venue. The 2028 plan implies $89.76 million across 16, which is $5.61 million per venue.
That is a 2.35x increase in what an average venue earns, or 135% more revenue from each park the company opens. Some of it can come from size: the Roswell conversion is described as 50,000 sq ft. But the disclosed trampoline cohort at that size earns $2.55 million, not $5.61 million, and adding food, beverage and arcade revenue to a trampoline box is what Dave & Buster’s does at $8.65 million per venue with a 20.8% margin.
So the assumption is not impossible. It is a statement that each new park will be a different business from the five currently open, closer to a full entertainment centre than to a trampoline park, and that it will run at a 30% margin while doing it.
That margin is the harder half. No operator in this set reports 30% at any level. The highest is Lucky Strike at 26.8% across 366 locations. The best trampoline cohort in the disclosed estate is 25.0%. A 30% assumption is three points above the highest reported figure in the comparison and eight points above the franchised average.
7. Why the multiple sits at 4x to 8x, not 12x
A multiple is a claim on cash flow after rent, capex and interest. Every disclosed operator in this set carries at least one of those claims heavily enough to explain why the range is where it is.
Dave & Buster’s earned $436.6 million of adjusted EBITDA in fiscal 2025 and reported a net loss of $48.7 million. The gap is rent, interest and depreciation on 243 leased venues with initial terms of 10 to 25 years. Enterprise value is used instead of equity value precisely because the lease sits ahead of the shareholder.
Lucky Strike holds $514.7 million of operating lease right-of-use assets and $324.1 million of finance lease right-of-use assets against 366 locations, 292 of them leased in the United States. Same-store revenue was flat at minus 0.2%. A flat top line with fixed lease obligations compresses what a buyer will pay for the next dollar of EBITDA.
Trampoline parks add a third claim: refurbishment. The disclosed capex for keeping a box current is not optional, and it recurs faster than the lease. We set out the venue-level numbers in the annual reinvestment analysis and the parts side of it in the five-year maintenance bill.
Dave & Buster’s publishes its own hurdle, which is the cleanest statement of what a new box has to earn. The company targets at least 30% cash-on-cash in year one and 25% over five years, defined as store-level adjusted EBITDA divided by net development cost, after tenant allowances and sale-leaseback proceeds. Reverse the year-one target on the average store’s $1.80 million of EBITDA and the implied net development cost is about $5.99 million.
Hold that against Table 2. At 6x, the same store is worth $10.78 million, or 1.8 times what it cost to build. That ratio, roughly 1.8x, is the developer margin the whole asset class runs on, and it is why a 6x multiple is the number people quote rather than 12x. At 12x, every box would be worth 3.6 times what it cost, and no operator would ever sell one.
8. What the data does and does not show
Four boundaries decide how far these numbers travel.
Coverage Sky Zone’s Item 19 reports 106 franchised parks, while the system held 122 franchised outlets at the end of 2025. The difference is parks that did not report a full year. The 106 are the reporting subset, and their average is not the system average.
Level Dave & Buster’s and Lucky Strike figures are corporate. They include head office cost, which a single park does not carry, and they include revenue lines a trampoline park does not have. Comparing their per-venue EBITDA to a unit-level trampoline figure overstates the trampoline margin and understates the corporate one. We use them as scale references, not as peer valuations.
Provenance The $161.6 million figure comes from an analysis commissioned by the company it values, built on unaudited, company-supplied projections. The release says so itself: roughly 80% of projected 2028 revenue comes from locations not yet open. Its 4x to 8x range and its reference to 7.2x to 10x for listed comparables are assertions inside that document. We did not verify a market price for any listed operator, and this article does not quote one.
Transactions There is no public database of trampoline park sale prices. Every multiple in this article is applied to a disclosed EBITDA from an operating business or a projection; none is drawn from a completed sale of a single park. A single-site sale typically prices below a portfolio because the buyer inherits concentration, a lease and a management team of one.
One more limit is worth stating plainly. These are cohort averages, and averages in this industry hide a wide distribution. Across the 106 Sky Zone parks, gross sales ranged from $601,841 to $7,971,315, a 13-fold spread. Any statement of the form “a trampoline park is worth X” is a statement about the middle of that range and nothing else.
And a correlation warning: the size bands are associated with different EBITDA, but the parks in them differ in metro, lease and vintage as well as floor area. Nothing here establishes that adding floor causes margin to fall. It establishes that the parks which chose more floor report lower margin per square foot.
9. Decision rules, not a forecast
Five rules follow from the tables above. Each one is a threshold you can test against your own numbers before a buyer tests it for you.
| If you are | The number that decides it | The rule |
|---|---|---|
| Building to hold | Value per sq ft at 6x against build cost per sq ft | If build cost per sq ft exceeds value per sq ft, the box is a cash-flow asset, not an appreciating one. Price the lease accordingly. |
| Building to sell | Revenue per venue and EBITDA margin | Below $2.5M of revenue or below 23% margin, the park prices under $3.5M at 6x. Above both, it enters the $4M range. |
| Adding an attraction | Annual EBITDA gain times 6 against capex | At a 6x multiple, a dollar of annual EBITDA is worth six. Capex with a payback longer than six years reduces value even when it raises revenue. |
| Choosing 30,000 or 50,000 sq ft | Value per sq ft by band | Value per sq ft falls 40% in the largest band. Add area only if the added revenue per sq ft stays at or above the band average. |
| Buying an existing park | Median, not average | Ask for the median of the cohort the park belongs to. In the disclosed estate the average sits above the median in both the full and screened cohorts. |
The practical use of all this is narrow and specific. When someone offers you a multiple, the only useful reply is to ask which EBITDA it applies to, over which twelve months, and after which add-backs. Those three questions decide more of the price than the multiple itself.
If you are at the design stage rather than the exit stage, the same arithmetic runs in reverse. The floor area you choose fixes the band you will be valued in, and the band fixes the value per square foot. Our design and quoting process starts with that number because it is cheaper to change a layout than a lease.
For a layout at a specific area, with the zone mix and the party room count that move a park between bands, the fastest route is a comparison against the cohort you are targeting. Our engineering team builds those comparisons from the same disclosed data used here.
Two related reads: the cost stack that turns EBITDA into a net loss, and the three-year comparison of Sky Zone’s Item 19.
FAQ
What multiple do trampoline parks sell for?
The range used in the most recent public valuation exercise is 4x to 8x EBITDA, with 6.0x applied to the base case and a reference to 7.2x to 10x for larger listed operators. Single parks usually price at the low end because the buyer takes on one lease, one management team and one trade area. No public dataset of completed park sales exists, so treat any multiple as a negotiating convention rather than a market price.
How much is a trampoline park worth per square foot?
In the disclosed Sky Zone estate, enterprise value at 6x runs from $75.48 to $126.18 per sq ft, or about $812 to $1,358 per m², depending on the size band. The peak sits in the 25,001–30,000 sq ft band, and the largest band carries the lowest value per square foot because its revenue per square foot is 36% lower.
Does revenue or profit decide the sale price?
Profit decides it, and revenue only matters through profit. The relationship is fixed: enterprise value divided by revenue equals the EBITDA multiple multiplied by the EBITDA margin. At 6x, a park with a 22% margin is worth 1.32 times revenue, and a park with a 30% margin is worth 1.80 times revenue. Two parks with identical sales can differ by a third in value on margin alone.
What lowers a trampoline park’s multiple?
Four things show up in the disclosed filings: a short remaining lease term against a long payback, deferred refurbishment, concentration in a single site, and negative same-store sales. Dave & Buster’s comparable store revenue fell 5.0% in fiscal 2025 while its adjusted EBITDA margin fell from 23.7% to 20.8%; Lucky Strike’s same-store revenue was flat at minus 0.2%. Flat or falling comps compress the multiple before anything else does.
How long does a trampoline park take to pay back?
Payback is capex divided by annual EBITDA, so it depends on the build cost you accept. Dave & Buster’s targets at least 30% cash-on-cash in year one and 25% over five years. A park at the franchised average, with $2.26 million of revenue and a 22% margin, generates about $497,000 of EBITDA; against a $3.5 million net build cost that is a seven-year payback, which is why the same-store sales line and the lease term carry so much weight in a sale.
Sources
- Lelantos Holdings Inc. via Newsfile, “Independent Analysis Implies ~$161.6M Enterprise Value for Airtopia Adventure Parks at Full 2028 Build-Out”, 30 July 2026. lelantosholdings.io
- Lelantos Holdings Inc. via Newsfile, “Airtopia Adventure Parks Signs Letter of Intent with JA Development & Construction for Multi-Site Build-Out Program Valued at ~$84 Million”, 4 August 2026. lelantosholdings.io
- CapAdvisors, “Sky Zone Franchise Unit Economics”, FY2025 Item 19 summary, accessed 13 November 2026. capadvisors.co
- Dave & Buster’s Entertainment Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 3 February 2026, Securities and Exchange Commission. sec.gov
- Lucky Strike Entertainment Corp., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 28 June 2026, Securities and Exchange Commission. sec.gov
- Lelantos Holdings Inc. via Newsfile, “Lelantos Holdings Reports $1.13 Million in August Revenue as Party Bookings Climb 24% Month-Over-Month Across Five Airtopia Parks”, 15 September 2026. lelantosholdings.io
- CapAdvisors, franchise unit economics methodology notes, accessed 13 November 2026. capadvisors.co
