Massachusetts Voids Gym Waiver: What Trampoline Parks Learn
On 10 November 2026, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the highest court in the state, held that a liability waiver signed at a children’s gymnastics center is unenforceable. The case is Ava E. Cross v. BeFree Enterprises, LLC, docket SJC-13933, decided by the full bench of seven justices in a 16-page opinion written by Justice Gabrielle R. Wolohojian.
The decision matters well beyond one gym in West Boylston. The court reached its result through a consumer-protection statute, not through general contract doctrine, and the statute’s definition of a covered business is broad enough that a trampoline park operator in Massachusetts has to answer a question the court has not yet answered: does a jump park count as a “health club” under this law?
This article walks through what the court held, what statute it used, why the three arguments the gym advanced all failed, what the ruling does not decide, and what an operator of a trampoline park or indoor playground should do with their trampoline park liability waiver in light of it. Every date and quotation below is traceable to the slip opinion or to the statutes it interprets.
1. The Ruling in One Table
Before the analysis, here is the shape of the case in numbers. All dates come from the summary judgment record described in the opinion; the derived intervals are our arithmetic, not the court’s.
| Item | Value | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Case | Ava E. Cross v. BeFree Enterprises, LLC (d/b/a The Little Gym of West Boylston) | Slip opinion, SJC-13933 |
| Decided | 10 November 2026 | Full court, 7 justices |
| Argued | 9 September 2026 | Transferred from the Appeals Court on the SJC’s own initiative |
| Lawsuit filed | 24 May 2022, Superior Court Department | Single count: negligence in supervision |
| Injury | 10 October 2021, beam station, broken arm | Child was five years old; a coach was present |
| Waivers signed | 28 October 2020 and August 2021 (identical wording) | Father signed at enrollment and re-enrollment |
| Litigation span | About 4 years 6 months, filing to decision | Derived: 24 May 2022 to 10 Nov 2026 |
| Waiver-to-decision span | About 6.0 years | Derived: 28 Oct 2020 to 10 Nov 2026 |
| Outcome | Summary judgment for the gym vacated; case remanded | Negligence itself was not decided |
One number deserves emphasis. The waiver bought the gym a summary judgment in the Superior Court and roughly four and a half years of litigation, and in the end it bought nothing. That is the trade every operator makes when they treat the signature at the front desk as a substitute for a supervision system.
The holding in one sentence: “the liability waiver is unenforceable and does not bar Ava’s negligence claim,” because Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93, section 80 prohibits waiver provisions in contracts for health club services, and section 85 makes a non-compliant contract “void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”
2. What the Court Actually Held
The opinion makes three findings from the summary judgment record, and each one maps onto a single statutory concept. If any one of the three had failed, the waiver would have survived.
| Finding | What the record showed | Statutory hook |
|---|---|---|
| Little Gym is a “health club” | A child development and gymnastic center giving classes to children up to age twelve, from four months old in parent and child classes, with coaches, padding and gymnastics equipment; its program includes a physical skills dimension covering motor and gymnastic skills | G.L. c. 93, § 78 definition of “health club” |
| The paperwork is a “contract for health club services” | Enrollment forms, the waiver and an online credit card payment for weekly classes, read together as one transaction | § 78 definition of “contract for health club services” |
| The claim arises from activities at the facility | Ava fell from equipment during a class; the suit alleges she was left unattended, breaching the duty to supervise | § 80, which bars waivers of claims “arising out of … the buyer’s activities at the health club” |
On the first finding, the gym argued that it was really an early-childhood enrichment program focused on social, emotional and cognitive development. The court’s answer was that this is not the question. As the opinion put it, “Although Little Gym may indeed have features that traditional exercise gyms do not, that is not the question.” The question is whether the business offers instruction in developing physical fitness, and a gymnastics center with coaches and equipment plainly does.
On the second finding, the gym argued that the waiver was a separate document, not part of the contract. The court read the waiver, the enrollment paperwork and the payment together as a single transaction forming one contract. The practical consequence is that a standalone release page does not escape the statute by sitting outside the enrollment agreement.
On the third finding, there was no real dispute. The injury happened during a class, at a beam station the child had used many times, when she tried to sit on top of a bar and fell. A claim arising from a patron’s activities at the facility is exactly the claim section 80 covers.
3. The 1985 Statute Behind the Decision
The Health Club Act, G.L. c. 93, §§ 78 through 88, has been on the books since 1985. The court applied its plain language, and the definitions matter more than any judicial gloss. Section 78 defines a “health club” as any facility “in which any person, firm, corporation … offers facilities for or instruction, training or assistance in the preservation, maintenance, encouragement or development of physical fitness, conditioning or well being.” The definition then lists examples and says the term “shall include, but not be limited to,” health spas, sports, tennis, racquet ball, platform tennis and health clubs, figure salons, health studios, gymnasiums, weight control centers or studios, martial arts and self-defense schools, or any other similar course of physical training.
Two features of that definition carry the whole decision, and both are worth reading slowly.
First, the list is expressly non-exclusive. The Legislature wrote “or any other similar course of physical training,” and the court stressed that breadth. A business does not need to appear in the list to be covered; it needs to offer facilities for, or instruction in, physical fitness or well-being.
Second, the word is “or.” The definition reaches a business that offers facilities for physical fitness even without instruction, and a business that offers instruction even without facilities. A children’s gymnastics center offers both, which is why the argument about enrichment character went nowhere. A facility that only provides open-jump sessions, without classes, sits closer to the “facilities for” side of the definition, and nobody has yet tested that side in Massachusetts.
The companion definition is even more pointed. A “contract for health club services” is a contract whose primary purpose is to provide the right to use the facilities of a health club or instruction, training or assistance “in the preservation, maintenance, encouragement or development of physical fitness, conditioning or well being,” and it expressly names “the teaching of martial arts including judo, karate and self-defense, or any similar course of physical fitness training or assistance.”
The court then connected the dots for every comparable business in one sentence: “Like Little Gym, martial arts and self-defense schools offer classes with instructors, and often to children.” That sentence is the reason this ruling travels beyond gymnastics. The Legislature named martial arts schools in 1985 precisely because a class with instructors and children looks the same whatever the discipline happens to be.
Finally, the enforcement mechanism is not left to judicial discretion. Section 80 prohibits the clause. Section 85 says a contract that violates the act is “void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.” There is no unconscionability balancing test, no conspicuousness requirement, no analysis of bargaining power. If the clause is there, the contract is void.
4. Three Arguments the Gym Made, and Why Each Failed
Operators reading the case should study the defense side, because the three arguments the gym advanced are the three arguments most waiver-based businesses would make. All three failed, and the reasons are transferable.
4.1 “We are not a gym, we are an enrichment program”
The court refused to weigh what the business calls itself. The statutory question is what the business offers. Coaches, classes, gymnastic equipment and motor-skill development are enough. Marketing language cannot contract around a statutory definition, and neither can a curriculum document.
4.2 “The waiver is a separate document”
The court treated the waiver, the enrollment forms and the payment as one transaction. The date pattern in the record made this easy: the grandmother completed the enrollment paperwork on 28 October 2020, the father signed the waiver the same day, and the grandmother paid online the following day. The same sequence repeated in August 2021. Paperwork signed at the same moment in the same transaction is one contract.
4.3 “Massachusetts favors enforcing releases”
The gym invoked the general rule that Massachusetts law respects contractual releases. The court agreed that such a preference exists and held that it does not matter. A legislature can ban releases in a specific setting, and this Legislature did, in 1985, for health club services. A general background rule loses to a specific prohibition.
5. What the Ruling Does Not Decide
This is the section that keeps an operator from over-reading the case. Four boundaries matter.
The negligence question remains open. The court vacated summary judgment and remanded. Whether the gym breached its duty to supervise, and whether that breach caused the broken arm, has not been decided and may never be. The waiver ruling is a threshold decision about what evidence a jury will get to hear.
Trampoline parks are not named in the decision. The court did not address day-pass venues, open-jump sessions or any family entertainment format. It held that a class-based children’s gymnastics center is a health club under the statute. Whether a trampoline park’s admission ticket is a “contract for health club services” with the “primary purpose” of providing fitness facilities is exactly the kind of question the next case will have to answer, and this article will not pretend the answer already exists.
The ruling binds Massachusetts only. Statutes are state law, and this one is Massachusetts law. An operator in Texas or Florida cannot read section 80 into their own contracts. What the ruling does do, everywhere, is raise the odds that plaintiffs’ counsel will look for a statutory hook in their own state, because the footnote in the opinion shows the court itself looked outward.
The franchisor was named alongside the franchisee. The waiver The Little Gym used releases “The Little Gym International, Inc. and its franchisees.” That drafting detail matters: the waiver purported to protect a franchisor that was not the party operating the facility, and the void clause took both down together. In a voided contract there is no partial survival for the corporate parent.
For contrast on how courts treat venue-level claims once they proceed past the waiver stage, our earlier coverage of a trampoline park liability case on fault apportionment, where a court assigned 70 percent of the fault over one missing barrier, shows what a fact fight looks like when the paperwork defense is gone: see Trampoline Park Liability: One Missing Barrier, 70 Percent Fault.
6. Where Waivers Stand Outside Massachusetts
The opinion’s own footnote notes that Hawaii, Maryland and New York have statutes restricting releases like this one, and cites decisions from Michigan, Pennsylvania and Washington. A Massachusetts ruling does not change those states, but together with it they sketch a map that every multi-site operator should keep on file. The table below sorts the landscape by mechanism.
| Jurisdiction | Mechanism | What it means for a youth activity provider |
|---|---|---|
| Massachusetts | Health Club Act (G.L. c. 93, §§ 78–88): waiver provisions void on their face, confirmed 10 Nov 2026 in Cross v. BeFree | Waiver cannot bar a negligence claim for activities at a covered facility; class-based children’s fitness is covered |
| Hawaii, Maryland, New York | Statutes restricting exculpatory agreements, named in the SJC’s footnote | Same statutory family; check each statute’s own scope before drafting |
| Minnesota | Justice v. Marvel, LLC (Minn. 2022): a commercial play center’s waiver held unenforceable on strict-construction grounds; the public-policy question was left open | Invalidation by narrow reading, not by statute; the next case could go either way |
| Pennsylvania | Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park: Superior Court and, in 2025, the state Supreme Court held a parent cannot bind a minor to arbitration; the exculpatory release itself was not ruled on | A trampoline park case, but an arbitration ruling; the release question remains open in Pennsylvania state court |
| Colorado | C.R.S. § 13-22-107: the Legislature reversed its Supreme Court to permit parental waivers | Waiver-friendly; the statute declares the restrictive holding was not adopted |
| Michigan | MCL 700.5109 covers only activities sponsored by non-governmental nonprofits and does not shield a commercial provider’s own negligence | A for-profit park gets nothing from the statute; restrictive case law still controls |
| United Kingdom | Consumer Rights Act 2015, s. 65(1): a trader cannot exclude liability for death or personal injury from negligence | The ban is total and statutory; releases do not work against consumers at all |
Attribution note: the Minnesota, Colorado, Michigan and Pennsylvania details are compiled from a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis published in the martial arts trade press after the ruling, and the Hawaii, Maryland and New York statutes are named in the opinion’s own footnote. Read each source before relying on any row, because statutes get amended.
Everywhere else in the United States, the working assumption for a commercial youth provider is narrower than most owners think. A waiver generally works only against an adult, for ordinary negligence, when it is conspicuous, specific, signed by the person whose claim is being waived, and unaccompanied by gross negligence or a statutory violation. Count the conditions and then count the share of your customers under eighteen. The protection is strongest exactly where a family entertainment business needs it least.
7. What a Trampoline Park Operator Should Do Instead
None of this means the waiver document is useless, and none of it means Massachusetts parks should stop collecting signatures. It means the document is one layer of a stack, and the layer underneath it has to carry the weight. Three moves matter, in order.
First, keep the waiver and rewrite what it claims to do. A document that only waives claims is dead on arrival in Massachusetts, but an acknowledgment of risk still does real work even where the release clause fails, because it documents what the patron was told. Draft the two separately and say different things in each. Where a release still functions, it functions against adults; write the adult version and the minor version as different documents.
Second, build the paper trail a supervision defense needs. The allegation in Cross was a failure to supervise, and the defense that survives such an allegation is a written floor standard, a trained staff and a record: session rosters, court ratios, equipment logs, dated inspection sheets. We have covered the operational side of this in detail before, from the supervision ratio a court imposed after a serious fall in Australia, see Trampoline Park Supervision: The 1:15 Ratio a Court Named, to the sightline design that removes the blind spots supervision depends on, see Trampoline Park Sightlines: Designing Out Court Blind Spots. A judge reads a staffing table differently when the operator can produce it.
Third, align insurance with the contract reality. A waiver that cannot bar claims changes the loss profile, not the premium question. Limits, defense costs, additional-insured status for the landlord and franchise-system coverage need to be checked against the actual exposure, and the franchise disclosure documents in this category show how wide those numbers run; see Trampoline Park Insurance Cost: What Three FDDs Actually Say. Get this wrong in a void-waiver state and the shortfall lands on the operating company, not on the piece of paper at the front desk.
One more drafting habit worth borrowing from the case itself. The injury in Cross happened at a station the child had used many times before, under the supervision of a coach who was present. Routine is exactly where supervision records go quiet, because nothing looks new. The record an operator keeps on an unremarkable Tuesday is the record a defense will need on the day something unremarkable goes wrong.
8. Summary: Four Rules to Take From the Case
- A statutory ban beats a well-drafted waiver. Where a legislature prohibits release clauses for a defined business type, drafting quality is irrelevant. The clause is void, and void means void for the franchisor too.
- The definition of the covered business is functional, not cosmetic. Courts ask what the business offers, not what its marketing says. Facilities for physical fitness, or instruction in it, is enough.
- Separate documents are still one contract. A standalone release page signed at enrollment gets read together with the enrollment forms and the payment.
- What protects a venue is a system, not a signature. Written supervision standards, staff training records and equipment logs are what turns a negligence allegation into a defensible question of fact.
For the equipment-side counterpart of this story, our overview of the certifications that govern indoor trampoline park equipment, see Global Safety Certifications for Indoor Trampoline Park Equipment, and our breakdown of injury patterns by zone, see Trampoline Park Injury Rates by Zone. Contract law and equipment standards are different regimes, and an operator who can speak both languages negotiates from a stronger position.
9. Three Things You Can Do Today
1. Audit your waiver against your state’s statute. If you operate in Massachusetts, Hawaii, Maryland or New York, assume the release clause in a children’s activity contract will not bar a claim, and raise it with your attorney before your next re-enrollment cycle rather than after an incident.
2. Separate the acknowledgment from the release. Keep one short document that records what patrons were told about risk, and keep the release, where it still works, as a distinct instrument. Date it, version it, and re-sign at re-enrollment, the way the record in Cross shows the gym did.
3. Put the supervision record in place before you need it. Session rosters, ratios by zone, incident logs and equipment checks, one page each. When you plan a new park or a refit with us, the supervision layout, sightlines and zone separation are part of the design conversation from the first draft, not an afterthought after opening. Tell us your floor plan and we will return a zoning proposal with the supervision logic marked on it.
One more check belongs on the same list: the franchise layer. If you are a franchisee, confirm whether your system’s waiver names the franchisor, and confirm who indemnifies whom when a clause is voided. If you are selecting a brand to work with, ask this question at signing, because the answer is cheap to get now and expensive to get in a remand.
FAQ
Is a liability waiver enforceable at a children’s gym or trampoline park in Massachusetts?
At a class-based children’s fitness facility, no. In Cross v. BeFree Enterprises (SJC-13933, decided 10 November 2026), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a waiver in a contract for health club services is void under G.L. c. 93, § 80, and § 85 makes the contract unenforceable. Whether a day-pass trampoline park falls within the same statutory definition has not been decided, but the definition covers businesses offering facilities for physical fitness even without classes, so the question is live for every FEC format in the state.
Can a parent sign away a child’s injury claim in Massachusetts?
Not where the Health Club Act applies. The father’s signature in Cross was held ineffective because the statute prohibits the waiver provision itself, and § 85 voids the contract as contrary to public policy. In other states the answer depends on state law: Colorado permits parental waivers by statute, Pennsylvania’s highest court has held a parent cannot bind a minor to arbitration in a trampoline park case, and many states have no controlling appellate decision on the question at all.
Does the Massachusetts health club statute apply to trampoline parks?
The court has not said. The statute covers facilities offering “facilities for or instruction, training or assistance” in physical fitness, conditioning or well-being, and its example list is expressly non-exclusive. A trampoline park offers facilities for physical activity, but the “primary purpose” test for a “contract for health club services” has not been applied to a day-pass venue. Treat the coverage question as open and get a state-specific legal opinion rather than copying a conclusion from a gymnastics case.
What should a waiver do if it cannot bar a negligence claim?
Document. A waiver still records that the patron was informed of specific risks, which is evidence a defense can use, and it may operate fully against adult signatories where no statute intervenes. What it cannot do, in a statute-ban state, is end a child’s negligence claim before discovery. The documents that actually decide those cases are supervision standards, staffing rosters, training records and equipment logs.
Which states void youth activity waivers?
By statute: Massachusetts for health club services after the 2026 Cross ruling, plus Hawaii, Maryland and New York, which the Massachusetts court’s footnote identifies as having statutes restricting such waivers. By court decision: Minnesota, where a commercial play center’s waiver failed on strict construction in 2022. By legislative permission: Colorado, which reversed its supreme court to allow parental waivers. Michigan’s statute protects only nonprofits. The United Kingdom bans the exclusion of negligence liability against consumers outright under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, s. 65(1).
Sources
- Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (slip opinion via Social Law Library), “Ava E. Cross v. BeFree Enterprises, LLC”, SJC-13933, decided 10 November 2026 – https://socialaw.com/services/slip-opinions/november-2026/ava-e-cross-1-vs-befree-enterprises-llc-2
- Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, “Negligence – Liability waiver – Health club”, 11 November 2026 – https://masslawyersweekly.com/2026/11/11/negligence-liability-waiver-health-club
- Law360 Consumer Protection, “Mass. Justices Say Gym’s Waiver Not Valid In Child Injury Suit”, 10 November 2026 – https://www.law360.com/consumerprotection/articles/2548514/mass-justices-say-gym-s-waiver-not-valid-in-child-injury-suit
- Business Insurance, “State high court voids children’s gym liability waiver”, 12 November 2026 – https://www.businessinsurance.com/state-high-court-voids-childrens-gym-liability-waiver
- Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93, Section 78 (definitions), full statutory text via Justia – https://law.justia.com/codes/massachusetts/part-i/title-xv/chapter-93/section-78/
- Martial Arts Professional, “Your Waiver Is a Blanket, Not a Wall. A Massachusetts Court Just Pulled It Off”, November 2026 – https://www.martialartsprofessional.com/massachusetts-liability-waiver-ruling-martial-arts-schools/
- Martial Arts Professional, “Where Your Waiver Works and Where It Is Waste Paper: A Jurisdiction-by-Jurisdiction Map”, November 2026 – https://www.martialartsprofessional.com/youth-liability-waivers-by-state-and-country-martial-arts-schools/
